Distributing a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) quickly to all vehicles in the system requires a very large number of road side units (RSUs) to be deployed. In reality, initial deployment stage of vehicle networks would be characterized by limited infrastructure as a result in very limited vehicle to infrastructure communication.
Ⅰ. Introduction
Vehicular network has been one of the emerging research areas and promising way to facilitate road safety, traffic management, and infotainment dissemination of drivers and passengers. However, without the integration of strong and practical security and privacy enhancing mechanisms, vehicular communication system can be disrupted or disabled, even by relatively unsophisticated attackers.
Security and privacy are essential components for the successful deployment of vehicle networks.
Those components need to be carefully assessed and addressed in the design of the vehicular communication system, especially because of the life-critical nature of the vehicular network operation. The IEEE 1609.2 standard [1] defines security services for vehicular networks. It defines secure message formats and techniques for processing these secure messages using the public key infrastructure (PKI). In traditional PKI architecture, the most commonly adopted certification revocation scheme is using certificate revocation lists (CRLs) method, which is a list of revoked certificates stored in repositories prepared by certificate authorities (CAs).
In vehicular networks, the CA adds the identification of the revoked certificate(s) to a CRL. The CA then publishes the updated CRL to all vehicular network participants, and instructing them not to trust the revoked certificate. Timely access to revocation information is important for the robustness of its operation: message faulty, compromised, or otherwise illegitimate, and overall potentially dangerous, vehicles can be ignored.
The CA employs a set of road side units 
Ⅱ. Related Works
The problem of certificate revocation in vehicular networks has hardly attracted any attention in the literature. Papadimitratos et al. [3] aim at achieving scalable and efficient mechanism for the distribution of large CRLs across wide regions by utilizing a very low bandwidth at each RSU. CRLs are encoded into numerous self-verifiable pieces, so vehicles only get from the RSUs those pieces of the CRLs. Laberteaux et al. [4] proposed that revocation information is distributed in the form of a CRL in an epidemic mechanism through vehicle-to-vehicle communications.
The mechanism provides significant advantages compare to the RSU-based distribution mechanism in terms of speed and breadth of network coverage. Lin et al. [5] [6] proposed a use of the existing multimedia broadcast multicast service over 3G cellular networks, which improve the efficiency of the distribution of the CRL. Sommer et al. [7] present simulation results of a 3G cellular-based vehicle-to-infrastructure traffic information system. Regarding the use of nomadic devices in vehicular networks, the ISO 13815 standard has been established to define the requirements of common software to a vehicle gateway to easily exchange vehicle information data among nomadic device, vehicle mobile gateway (VMG) and the vehicle's engine control units (ECUs) [8] . The standard also specifies the interface between VMG and nomadic device for provisioning and support of VANET service. Consequently, nomadic devices could be utilized as a communication mediator especially, in initial deployment stage of vehicular networks.
On the other hand, we can find some works that adopt nomadic devices, especially Android based smartphone, to support all sorts of VANET service. Hernandez et al. [9] developed a prototype of an on-board unit that allows the driver to communication with his vehicle, as well as with other available devices (PDAs, cellular, sensor networks, and so on) and with the road infrastructure in order to consume VANET service. Spelta et al. [10] implemented a system for vehicle-to-driver and vehicle-to-environment communication, based on a smart-phone core and Bluetooth communication. Jorge et al. [11] proposed combining existing vehicles with smartphones to achieve a solution able to improve security on the road. The smartphones are used as an alternative on-board unit within the vehicle.
Ⅲ. Design of a CRL Acquisition Method
A nomadic device could be used as alternative WAVE security functions of the vehicle, accessing the information in the vehicle's internal bus wirelessly. More specifically, it is possible to use the nomadic device with capability of the WAVE security functions when the vehicle is out of the communication range of nearby RSUs. In this section, we present an example of how a nomadic device can be properly integrated with the VMG to achieve the security functions through wireless communication networks.
The security functions will provide the WAVE security services for applications and management messages defined in IEEE 1609.2 [1] ; those will ensure that the information received is correct (information authenticity), the source is who he claims to be (message integrity and source authentication), the node sending the message cannot be identified and tracked (privacy) and the system is robust and so on. To integrate nomadic devices into vehicular networks, Fig. 2 We assume that the security mediator in the nomadic device only performs CRL acquisition related functions, not providing full WAVE security functions in this paper. Thus, the nomadic device is utilized as a CRL acquisition device and an application capable of relaying
CRLs to the security-specific ECU. Also, the nomadic device has a capability to communicate with CA through cellular networks, and the VMG through Bluetooth interface. The security mediator can be implemented as a smartphone application.
Functional Requirements of Nomadic
Device The basic function of a security mediator is to allow a nomadic device to receive CRLs from CA and to forward them to the internal security-specific ECU if vehicle-to-RSU connectivity is not available. The functional requirements for providing the proposed method are identified as follows:
○ The nomadic device has communication redundancy by using a WAVE network interface and a 3G cellular network interface.
○ The nomadic device has to have the ability to identify and use appropriate communication media for providing stable connectivity.
○ If vehicle-to-RSU connectivity is not available, the nomadic device has to have the ability to activate the security mediator automatically. In some cases, user can active the security mediator function manually.
○ To access the VMG, the nomadic device performs user or device authentication based on the pre-shard secrets [8] .
○ The nomadic device can receive CRLs from CA continuously through cellular networks. ○ Upon receiving CRLs, the nomadic device forwards them to the VMG 3.2. CRL Acquisition Procedure and Algorithm The CRL acquisition procedure and algorithm are depicted in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 respectively. This use case demonstrates that the security mediator application in the nomadic device gets the most recent CRLs from CA and forwards them to the VMG in the vehicle when user enters a vehicle and the nomadic device has been equipped with its holder without user interruption.
The CRL acquisition procedure involves the following steps: (1) the security mediator would be activated initially, (2) it requests user authentication, where user name and password for user or device authentication would be send to the VMG, (3) if authentication is successful, the VMG returns the user Authentication succeed. to the nomadic device, (4) if the security mediator supports full WAVE security functions, security operations would be performed between the CA and the security-specific ECU. However, this step will not be performed since the security mediator only performs CRLs acquisition, not providing full WAVE security functions, (5) the CA in the vehicular networks would distribute CRLs periodically. The nomadic device would receive the list from CA and relay it to the VMG, (6) the VMG also would relay it to the security-specific ECU, (7) the security-specific ECU would use them to provide secure communications and user privacy protection. 
Ⅳ. Implementation and Test
In order to realize the security mediator, we implement a software of security mediator running on android-based smartphone, called CRLacq application, by using Android SDK(v.2.2) and Eclipse Galileo IDE(v.1.2.2) software tools [12] . The smartphone equipped with different wireless interface thus, IEEE 802.11p, Bluetooth, and 3G cellular. The CRL acquisition procedure and algorithm described in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 have been implemented on the Pentium IV notebook with 1.73GHz and the Pentium IV desktop with 2.82GHz respectively.
To distribute CRLs, we utilize the Android Cloud to Device Messaging (C2DM) service that supports push service through 3G cellular network and helps developers send data from servers to their applications on Android devices [13] . In the C2DM service, three parties are involved as shown in Fig. 5 ; the CA server (e.g, application server) which wants to push messages to the nomadic device, the C2DM server, and the CRLacq application in the nomadic device. The C2DM service allows nomadic devices to register and receive push notifications from C2DM servers. The CA server creates CRLs as shown in Table 1 for test and sends them via an HTTP POST to the C2DM server as shown in Fig. 5 .
Upon receiving the CRLs, the C2DM server routes them to the nomadic device and then, the CRLacq application can receive them. Whenever the CRLacq application receives CRLs then, it relays them to the security-specific ECU through the VMG. Fig. 6 
